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TRADE REGULATION: SECOND CIRCUIT FINDS
SHERMAN ACT VIOLATION IN MUSICIANS UNION'S
PRICE-FIXING BUT EXEMPTS COERCED UNIONIZATION
OF ORCHESTRA LEADERS
T Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Carroll v. American Fed'n
of Musicians,' found that the Musicians Union violated the Sherman
Act 2 by establishing the minimum price charged for certain orchestral
engagements. Dissident orchestra leaders had grounded their anti-
trust suit on particular union by-laws which not only forced per-
forming orchestra leaders to be union members but also imposed
various ancillary restrictions upon their activities, including the
regulation of price floors for orchestral engagements.8 These and
similar rules were promulgated by the union as a means of effectu-
ating and preserving its control over the diverse components of the
"music product" market in New York City.4 In this market, steady
engagements, which are those exceeding a week's duration, and
"non-club" single engagements, which consist of recording and tele-
vision appearances, are generally covered by collective bargaining
contracts that classify the orchestra leader as an employee of the
music purchaser.5 However, those limited performance comprising
the "club-date" field are rarely covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. For these events, such as weddings, parties, and so forth,
the orchestra leader is an employer or independent contractor. 6
Since "employer-orchestra leaders" frequently take jobs as "sidemen"
(orchestra members) or sub-leaders, they may alternatively occupy
the roles of both employer and employee. Regardless of their func-
tion, however, all musicians must belong to the union and are
subject to its rules. The district court denied that this union con-
trol of employer activities, including the maintenance of minimum
price floors, constituted a violation of the antitrust laws, finding no
1372 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967).
2 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
3 Carroll v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 241 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afJ'd in
part, retld in part, 372 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1967).
'See id. at 158.
'241 F. Supp. at 890, 891; 372 F.2d at 158-59.
OId. at 159. See 241 F. Supp. at 887. See generally LmTma, Tan MUSICIANS AND
PEnuLLo (1953).
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evidence of a conspiracy to restrain trade between the union and
member orchestra leaders.7 The trial court further held that the
competition between employer leaders and employee sub-leaders
constituted a labor dispute to which the Sherman Act was in-
applicable.8
Labor organizations are generally exempt from the federal
antitrust laws when their activity pertains to a "labor dispute" con-
cerning "terms or conditions of employment."9  However, in two
narrow instances, a union becomes subject to liability under the
Sherman Act.10 First, as indicated by the Supreme Court in Allen
Bradley Co. v. Local 3, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,"' a
labor organization forfeits its Sherman Act immunity by pursuing
its objectives through an anticompetitive conspiracy with a non-
labor group.12 More recently, in UMW v. Pennington,3 the Court
reaffirmed the Allen Bradley doctrine by holding that a union's
imposition of anticompetitive wages upon employers outside the
bargaining unit violated the antitrust laws. 4 Secondly, a union may
transgress these laws by unilaterally pursuing objectives insufficiently
related to "terms or conditions of employment," the statutory re-
quirement which prescribes the substance of the labor exemption.' 5
However, it is unclear whether this antitrust immunity is co-
extensive with the protection which Congress afforded labor activity
7 241 F. Supp. at 891.
8 ld. at 887-89.
9 Clayton Act § 6, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964); Clayton Act § 20, 38
Stat. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964); Norris-LaGuardia Act § 13, 47 Stat. 73 (1932),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 113 (1964); see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232-
34 (1941); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512 (1940).
10 See Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L.
Rav. 317, 318-19, 325-27 (1966); Hoener, The Supreme Court and the Labor Exemption,
29 A.B.A. ANTrrITr SECTION 133-37 (1965). See generally Bernhardt, The Allen
Bradley Doctrine: An Accommodation of Conflicting Policies, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 1094
(1965); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, 104 U. PA. L. RE. 252 (1955); Meltzer,
Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining, and the Antitrust Laws, 32 U. Cm. L. Rav. 659
(1965); Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition: The Application of Antitrust
Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14 (1963); Comment, 1966 DuKE L.J. 191.
11 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
"Id. at 809-10; see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234-37 (1941).
18381 U.S. 657 (1965). See generally Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington
and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REV. 317 (1966); Comment, 1966 DurE L.J. 191.
1, 381 U.S. at 665-68.
25 See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 690
(1965); Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 98-102 (1962);
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232-36 (1941); Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd.
v. International Longshoremen's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562, 566 (D. Hawaii 1947); cf.
Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-95 (1959).
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under the National Labor Relations Act. To determine the scope
of this immunity, the Supreme Court has attempted to reconcile
the labor and antitrust policies by sanctioning a union's anticompeti-
tive efforts in the labor market but disapproving attempts to suppress
strictly commercial competition in the product market.16 The
pivotal difficulty lies in distinguishing between "commercial" and
"labor" activity. In Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel
Tea Co.,' 7 three members of a severely divided Court reasoned
that a "strong argument" existed in favor of the labor exemption
where union efforts are directed toward subjects of mandatory col-
lective bargaining-"wages, hours, and conditions of employment."' 8
Nonetheless, their view, as expressed by Mr. Justice White, was that
the "crucial determinant" of the labor exemption was whether the
union's interest in the desired agreement was greater than its "impact
on the product market."' 9 However, in the opinion of three con-
curring Justices, all mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, that
is, any matters of "direct and overriding interest" to the union, were
totally exempt from the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.20 Yet
even Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the latter group, agreed that
union interference in strictly entrepreneurial decisions, such as price-
setting, was subject to antitrust regulation because such activity im-
pinged directly upon competition in the product market. 21 Hence,
both groups seemed to agree that at some point the union's interest
in a particular objective is overridden by the congressional design
for free competition among employers.
The difficulty of weighing union interests against the need for
commercial competition is most pronounced where an independent
businessman or contractor performs the same work as unionized
employees.22  The NLRA prohibits the coerced unionization of a
18 Compare Hunt v. Crumboch, 325 U.S. 821, 824 (1945), with Hawaiian Tuna
Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Union, supra note 15, at 566-67. See
Meltzer, supra note 10, at 688; Winter, supra note 10, at 42. But see Cox, Labor and
the Antitrust Laws, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 252, 267-70 (1955). See generally Winter,
supra note 10.
17 381 U.S. 676 (1965); Comment, 1966 DUKE L.J. 191.
is 381 U.S. at 689. See Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel
Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv. 317, 324-27 (1966).
19 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.
20 Id. at 709-12 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
31 See id. at 732-33 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
22 See Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94 (1962); Local
24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959); Local 753, Milk Drivers' Union v.
Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91 (1940); Greenstein v. National Skirt &
[Vol. 1967: 703
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truly independent contractor,2 3 one who is not subject to the control
of the employer.2 4  Yet, if the contractor actually functions as an
employee by competing for union jobs, the courts have recognized'
that the labor organization has an interest in regulating the con-
tractor's wages, hours, and other conditions of employment in order
to prevent the erosion of union standards by nonunion labor.
2 5
However, such regulation may also interfere directly with the
product market to the extent that it allows the union to dominate
firms which offer services similar to those performed by union mem-
bers.26  Moreover, union control of a contractor's "employee" status
may restrict his decisions as an employer in the product market.
27
Prior to Jewel Tea, the Supreme Court had posited the availability
of antitrust remedies to prevent union regulation of noncompeting
independent contractors. In Los Angeles Meat Drivers v. United
States,28 the Court affirmed an order cancelling the union member-
ship of contractors who had admittedly been organized for the
purpose of controlling a supply of raw material in violation of the
antitrust laws. The Court held that the absence of economic rivalry
between employees and contractors rendered the latter a non-labor
group and their unionization a conspiracy in restraint of trade. How-
ever, this "competition" criterion for antitrust immunity does not
satisfy the test advocated by Mr. Justice White in Jewel Tea, since his
approach would require a specific finding that the threat which the
independent businessman poses to matters of direct union interest
Sportswear Ass'n, 178 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 430
(2d Cir. 1960); Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. International Longshoremen's Union,
72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Hawaii 1947); cf. United States v. Fish Smokers' Trade Council,
Inc., 183 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfg.
Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949); Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143
(1942). See generally Note, 67 YALE L.J. 98 (1957); 24 U. Cssi. L. REv. 733 (1957).
2 National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b) (4) (A), added by 61 Stat. 141 (1947),
amended by 73 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A) (1964); cf. Hoener, supra note 10,
at 144 n.61. See also National Labor Relations Act §2 (3), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 152 (3) (1964).
2" See NLRB v. Steinberg, 182 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1950); Meltzer, supra note 10,
at 685-86; cf. Los Angeles Meat Drivers v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 107 (1962)
(Goldberg, J., concurring). -
25See Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union v. United States, supra note 24, at 103
(dictum); Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 393-94 (1959); Local 753,
Milk Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Prods., Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1940); Hoener,
supra note 10, at 144 n.62; Meltzer, supra note 10, at 678-87; Winter, supra note 10,
at 54.
26 Meltzer, supra note 10, at 678-87.
1'7 See 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 733, 739-40 (1957).
"371 U.S. 94, 102 (1962).
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surpasses the anticompetitive impact that the union-controlled em-
ployers exert on the product market.2 9 Under Mr. Justice Goldberg's
standard a union's direct interest in preserving its standards in the
labor market would presumably overcome any effects upon product
market competition. 0
It was the element of businessman-employee competition in the
labor market which complicated the antitrust decisions in Carroll
v. American Fed'n of Musicians. Although the Second Circuit
reaffirmed prior decisions3' that orchestra leaders are employers in
the "club-date" field, nevertheless the court found no conspiracy
between the union and member orchestra leaders absent evidence
of union intent to achieve its goals through commercial restraint in
the product market.32  Accordingly, the court held that the com-
pelled acquiescence of "employer-orchestra leaders" in union by-laws
was not violative of the Sherman Act. Having thus disposed of the
alleged union-employer conspiracy, the Court of Appeals then in-
terpreted Mr. Justice White's opinion in Jewel Tea as asserting that
any mandatory subject of collective bargaining was immune from
the strictures of the Sherman Act.38 Allying this interpretation with
Mr. Justice Goldberg's "union interest" concept, the court arrived
at an obfuscated view of Jewel Tea: seemingly, matters of direct
union interest above and beyond those which are mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining are sufficient to permit the invocation of labor's
exemption from antitrust liability. In deciding the price-fixing
issue, the Second Circuit first rejected the local's alleged interest in
controlling prices because they are the source of employee wages.
Such union price-determination, stated the court, invades the
"proper function of management" and distorts the balance between
the antitrust and the labor laws.34 Rejecting the union's additional
21 See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-91
(1965); Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws: Pennington and Jewel Tea, 46 B.U.L. REv.
317, 326-27 (1966); Meltzer, supra note 10, at 718-20, 724-27, 732-34. See also Cox, Labor
and the Antitrust Laws, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252, 267-70 (1955); Winter, supra note 10,
at 54.
31 See 381 U.S. at 727-29 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
s1 Carroll v. Associated Musicians, 206 F. Supp. 462, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afj'd, 316
F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1963); Cutler v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 211 F. Supp. 433, 446
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 941 (1963).
11372 F.2d at 164. See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1962).
33 372 F.2d at 165.
" Ibid.
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argument that price-fixing was "essential to the mandatory subject of
job protection," the court noted that wages saved through employer-
performed work might well provide the orchestra leader a competi-
tive edge in the market, resulting in more, not less, work for union
employees.3 5 Furthermore, an employer's choice to perform work
otherwise claimable by an employee is not'a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining.3 6 Thus, the Second Circuit determined that
price-fixing was not justified on either of the criteria derived from
Jewel Tea.
Simultaneously, the coerced unionization of performing orchestra
leaders was exempted from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws
as a legitimate effort to achieve a closed shop. 7 While the court
did not, and obviously could not, hold that the closed shop was a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the NLRA,38 it did
rule that the closed shop was a matter of "legitimate union concern"
as a "term or condition of employment."3' 9 Apparently subsuming
the closed shop without the broader and permissible mandatory sub-
ject of union security, the court determined that Carroll was not
a case where the employers "do not present job threats to union
members." 40  Thus the orchestra leader's employee status in the
steady and "non-club" date fields, as well as the interchange of
employer-enployee roles in the "club-date" market itself, led the
court to conclude that "every time a non-union orchestra leader
performs, he displaces a 'union job' with a 'non-union job.'41
The compelled organization of employers was therefore permissible
to achieve uniform labor standards-a matter of direct union in-
terest.
This remedy of the Second Circuit is ultimately ineffectual as
3Id. at 166.
8 Ibid. But cf. Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-95 (1959).
37 372 F.2d at 167-68.
38 See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-42 (1963); NLRB v. Local
996, Teamsters Union, 313 F.2d 655, 663 (9th Cir. 1963); National Labor Relations
Act, § 8 (a) (3), added by 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1964) (outlaws the
closed shop). See generally 1 NLRB, LEGiSLATiVE HSTORY OF ThE LABoR MANAGEMENT
RZLATiONS Acr, 1947, at 545, 612, 867 (1948); 2 id. at 1596-97.
8"1372 F.2d at 167. Compare Kolb v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 141 F. Supp. 264 (N.D.
Cal. 1956). See generally Winter, supra note 10.
" See 372 F.2d at 168. See also United States v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 47
F. Supp. 304 (N.D. Ill. 1942), aff'd per curiam, 318 U.S. 741 (1943). See generally
Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-95 (1959).
,1372 F.2d at 168.
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well as anomalous for it prohibits union-imposed price schedules
while allowing the local to prevent non-union employers from enter-
ing the market as performing orchestra leaders. Such an empty
result might well have been avoided by discarding the bifurcated
Jewel Tea test in favor of a sui generis approach as advocated by
the dissenting judge.4 2  The "club-date" market emphasized in
Carroll presents an unusual situation: not only does the union
maintain a virtual closed shop of performing employers, but the
possibility of meaningful collective bargaining is minimized by both
the transitory nature of employment and the frequent interchange of
roles between employer and employee. Since the union excludes
the noncomplying performer from the market, the effect of this em-
ployer closed shop is to eliminate price competition, thereby de-
priving the public of lower music costs. However, the elimination
of price-fixing does not dissipate the union's ultimately anticompet-
itive control over orchestra leaders. The entire scheme must be
evaluated. Accordingly, the antitrust consequences of this arrange-
ment depend on whether union control over the performing or-
chestra leader and the rates he charges is necessary to the protection
of union work and wages.43  That inquiry is predicated upon the
existence of job competition between the employer and employee. 4
There is no competition regarding the employer's choice to fulfill all
aspects of his role, including that of conducting the orchestra. Con-
sequently, he presents no threat to union musicians: he does not
displace musicians but rather creates jobs for them. Therefore,
contrary to the decision of the Second Circuit, the union should not
be permitted to impose any of its controls on the performing
orchestra leader when he functions in that capacity. A leader free
from such restrictions would present a competitive alternative in a
union-dominated market and would also provide a potential partner
for effective collective bargaining. 45 However, since the performing
orchestra leader often works as a sideman, union membership and
regulation of his employee activities would also appear to be appro-
priate. Yet such a dichotomization for the purpose of delineating
the sphere of union control assumes that a labor organization can
42 Id. at 169-70 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
Is Compare Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 293-95 (1959), with
Los Angeles Meat Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 98-103 (1962).
"Id. at 98; see Local 24, Teamsters Union v. Oliver, supra note 43,, at 293-94.
49 See 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 733, 739-40 (1957).
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simultaneously be both an effective agent as well as a bargaining
opponent of its own members. The unrealistic nature of this
hypothesis may account for the Second Circuit's failure to find an
antitrust violation in any union conduct other than the price-
fixing. However, only such a circumscription of the union's power
properly reflects a reconciliation of the antitrust laws with the
legitimate labor pursuits of the Musicians Union.
